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Overview of Family Law FAMILY LAW -- GENERAL OVERVIEW |
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
When an individual files for divorce in the State of Maine, he or she must state the problems leading to the dissolution of the marriage. There are eight "grounds" for divorce in Maine. However, in recent years more states, including Maine, have allowed a party to obtain a divorce even though no party is at fault for the problems in the marriage. This is called a "no fault" divorce and the party filing the Complaint for Divorce need only allege that there are irreconcilable differences in the marriage.
Maine law requires, however, that before a person files for a divorce they must have resided in good faith in the State of Maine for six months prior to the commencement of the action. The Plaintiff can always file a divorce action in Maine if his or her spouse resides in the State. One unique aspect of Maine law is the fact that with the service of a Complaint for Divorce, a preliminary injunction automatically issues, enjoining either party from 1) transferring assets, except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life, without written consent of the other party or permission of the Court, (2) restraining the personal liberty of the other party or child; or (3) voluntarily removing the other party or a child from health insurance coverage.
Maine law requires all parties to participate in a Case Management Conference, typically scheduled to be held approximately one month after the service of the Complaint. The Case Management Officer is empowered to make any decisions with regards to child support. In addition, unless specifically waived by either party, the Officers may make interim temporary orders addressing which spouse will have the use of the marital home, responsibility for marital bills and debts, temporary support and alimony, temporary parental rights and responsibilities for children under the age of 18, and responsibility for attorney's fees.
Maine law requires mandatory mediation between the parties prior to any contested hearing, either pending or post-divorce, on any issue if there is a minor child or children of the parties.
At the final hearing on the Complaint for Divorce, the Court is required to set apart to each spouse his or her separate, non- marital property and to divide the marital property in such a manner as the Court deems just and equitable. This means that Maine is an "equitable distribution" State. This also requires the Court to distinguish marital property from non-marital property. Under Maine law, "marital property" means all property acquired by either spouse after the marriage except 1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; 2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; 3) property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation; 4)property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; or 5) the increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage. Thus, Maine law presumes that all property is marital unless one party proves that a particular item of property is non-marital. A particular item of property may have both martial and non-marital components. In that event, the Court must set aside to the prevailing party that portion which is non-marital and equitably divide the marital component of the property. Over the past several years, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, also known as the Law Court, which reviews the decisions of the lower courts, developed several rules as aids in distinguishing non-marital and marital property. In 1977, the Court issued a decision in Long v. Long, 1997 ME 171 (Me. 1997), that reversed previous decisions apportioning jointly held real estate into marital and non-marital estates as a result of alleged non-marital contributions to the acquisition of the real estate. Thus, with regards to real estate, the current law is that if real estate is held in joint ownership, it is marital property regardless of any non-marital contribution to its acquisition. Because Maine is an equitable distribution state, parties can still argue for a larger portion of the real estate because of a non-marital contribution. However, there is no longer an issue with regards to the characterization of the property as marital or non-marital. Because Long specifically addresses real estate, there may still exist arguments with regards to the characterization of property other than real estate. Thus, the previous definitions created by the Law Court may still be applicable in those situations, although it would be the exception rather than the rule. The "inception of title" rule focuses on the state of the title to property when it is first purchased. The "transmutation" rule holds that non-marital property may be transformed into marital property. The transmutation rule does not apply to transfers prior to January 1, 1972, which was the effective date of the revised marital property statute. The "source of funds" rule grants to each estate an interest in proportion to marital or non-marital contributions made towards the acquisition of the property. The exception which provides that property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequeath, devise, or descent is embodied in the "source of funds" rule. Thus, in a divorce, the trial Court does not rely on who holds legal title to property. Instead, it looks to the source of funds that were used to create the value the property now has to the parties. The marital and nonmarital interests in property are determined by comparing the ratio of marital and separate contributions to the acquisition of property. Previously, a spouse claiming that a nonmarital asset has increased in value during the marriage and that this increase in value was marital, had the burden to prove that the asset increased in value because marital money or efforts were invested in the asset rather than simply because the inherent value of the property itself increased. Two cases, however, appeared to substantially shift this burden of proof: Harriman and Clum held that income, even if from a non-marital asset, was marital. The individual asserting that the asset was non-marital had to prove what portion of the increase in value was "passive," thus the increase attributable to the "income" being reinvested in the asset would be marital. Legislation passed in 2000 specifically reversed the marital/nonmarital aspect of Harriman and Clum, although a spouse can still argue that an increase in value of a nonmarital asset was a result of marital effort, thus maintaining a marital component. In addition, the basic premise of Harriman and Clum - that income during the marriage from all sources is marital - remains intact. In order for the Court to equitably divide the parties' marital property, it must consider all relevant factors, including 1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker; 2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse; and 3) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children. It is important to note that the Court is not allowed to consider fault in the distribution of property.
The alimony statute was revised in 2000, defining various types of spousal support, including general, transitional, reimbursement, nominal, and interim support. There is a rebuttal presumption that general spousal support may not be awarded if the parties were married for less than ten years as of the date of the filing of the action for divorce. There is also a rebuttal presumption that general support may not be awarded for a term exceeding one-half the length of the marriage if the parties were married at least ten years, but no more than twenty years. In addition, the Court, when granting, denying, or modifying spousal support, must state 1) the type of support being awarded, the method of payment, the term and limitations imposed, if the support award is no subject to future modification, and the factors relied upon the Court in arriving at its decision to award, or deny, spousal support. The statute still identifies a number of factors the Court must consider with determining an award of alimony: 1) the length of the marriage; 2) the ability of each party to pay; 3) the age of each party; 4) the employment history and employment potential of each party; 5) the income history and income potential of each party'; 6) the education and training of each party; 7) the provisions for retirement and health insurance benefits of each party; 8) the tax consequences of the division of marital property, including the tax consequences of the sale of the marital home, if applicable; 9) the health and disabilities of each party; 10) the tax consequences of an alimony award; 11) the contributions of either party as homemaker; 12) the contributions of either party to the education or earning potential of the other party; 13) economic misconduct by either party resulting in the diminution of marital property or income; 14) the standard of living of the parties during the marriage; and 15) any other factors the Court considers appropriate. Instead of alimony, the Court may order either party to pay a specific sum to the other party. It is important to note that the Court cannot expect a spouse to live on marital property set aside to him or her in the divorce. In other words, an award of alimony should be based on the factors outlined in the statute and should not be modified based on how much property the spouse received through the divorce process. As is the case with the division of marital property, fault is not a statutory consideration when determining the appropriateness of alimony. However, the Court can consider any financial misconduct of a spouse when determining an appropriate award of alimony. Another interesting aspect of Maine law is that the Court, at any time, may alter or amend a decree for alimony or specific sum when it appears that justice requires it, except that a Court cannot increase the alimony if the original decree prohibits an increase. In contrast, even if a settlement agreement prohibits alimony from being decreased, the Court still has power to decrease alimony under extraordinary circumstances. A non-increase clause is enforceable, but a non-decrease clause is not.
Maine law no longer utilizes the word "custody." What was formerly known as custody has been divided into two separate categories: Parental rights and responsibilities and residency. Although Maine statute does not expressly require the Court to designate the division of time during which the child will be residing with either parent, the Court will often designate a primary residency for the children and the parental contact between the non-residential parent and the children. The Court is required, however, to determine the division of parental rights and responsibilities for the children. In making an award of parental rights and responsibilities with respect to a minor child, the Court is required to apply the standard of what is in the best interest of the child. In applying this standard, the Court must consider the following factors: 1) the age of the child;2) the relationship of the child with the child's parents and any other persons who may significantly affect the child's welfare; 3) the preference of the child, if old enough to express a meaningful preference; 4) the duration and adequacy of the child's current living arrangements and the desirability of maintaining continuity; 5) the stability of any proposed living arrangements for the child; 6) the motivation of the parties involved and their capacities to give the child love, affection and guidance; 7) the child's adjustment to the child's present home, school and community; 8) the capacity of each parent to allow and encourage frequent and continuing contact between the child and the other parent, including physical access; 9) the capacity of each parent to cooperate or to learn to cooperate in child care; 10) methods for assisting parental cooperation and resolving disputes and each parent's willingness to use those methods; 11) the effect on the child if one parent has sole authority over the child's upbringing; 12) the existence of a history of domestic abuse between the parents; and 13) all other factors having a reasonable bearing on the physical and psychological well-being of the child. The Court may award sole or shared parental rights and responsibilities, or may allocate parental rights and responsibilities between the parties. Shared parental rights and responsibilities means that most or all aspects of a child's welfare remain the joint responsibility and right of both parents, so that both parents retain equal parental rights and responsibilities and both parents must confer and make joint decisions regarding the child's welfare. While there is no statutory presumption that the Court should order shared parental rights and responsibilities, where the parents have agreed to an award of shared parental rights and responsibilities or so agree in open Court, the Court shall make that award unless there is substantial evidence that it should not be ordered. The Court shall state in its decision the reasons for not ordering a shared parental rights and responsibilities award agreed to by the parents. Sole parental rights and responsibilities means that one parent is granted exclusive parental rights and responsibilities with respect to all aspects of a child's welfare, with the possible exception of the right and responsibility for support. Allocated parental rights and responsibilities means that responsibilities for the various aspects of a child's welfare are divided between the parents, with the parent allocated a particular responsibility having the right to control that aspect of the child's welfare. Responsibilities may be divided exclusively or proportionately. Aspects of a child's welfare for which responsibility may be divided include primary physical residence, parent-child contact, support, education, medical and dental care, religious upbringing, travel boundaries and expenses and any other aspect of parental rights and responsibilities. A parent allocated responsibility for a certain aspect of a child's welfare may be required to inform the other parent of major changes in that aspect. The Court may award parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child to a third person, some suitable society or institution for the care and protection of children or the Department of Human Services upon a finding that awarding parental rights and responsibilities to either or both parents will place the child in jeopardy. It is also important to note that there is no presumption that siblings should not be separated, and that the Court may not apply a preference for one parent over the other in determining parental rights and responsibilities because of the parent's sex or the child's age or sex. The Court also has the power to appoint a Guardian ad Litem in a disputed custody case. "Ad Litem" literally means "of the case" and the guardian is charged with investigating the situation and formulating a recommendation to the Court with regards to what is in the best interests of the child. In effect, the guardian represents the child or children in a disputed custody case, even though the guardian's duty is to the Court. In other words, the guardian is the Court's expert and is in no way representing the parents in the divorce. Recently, the Law Court ruled that the divorce Court can consider one parent's unsuccessful prosecution of a protection from abuse complaint against the other parent when awarding parental rights and responsibilities only if the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence both 1) that the parent willfully misused the protection process in order to gain a tactical advantage in the divorce proceeding and 2) that in the particular circumstances of the divorcing couple and their children, that willful misuse tends to show that the acting parent will after the divorce have a lessened ability and willingness to work with the other parent in their joint responsibility for the children. Either parent, or an agency of third person who has been granted parental rights and responsibilities with respect to a child, may always petition the Court to modify the previously determined custody arrangements. However, only a substantial change of circumstances will warrant a modification of a judgment, and the petitioning party has the burden of proving the existence of a substantial change of circumstances and that the previous order should be changed or modified. Maine law does state that the relocation, or intended relocation, of a child who is a Maine resident to another state by a parent, when the other parent is a resident in this State and there exists an award of shared or allocated parental rights and responsibilities concerning the child, is a substantial change of circumstances, allowing the Court to review the custodial arrangements in light of the relocation.
Maine has adopted child support guidelines promulgated by the Department of Human Services. The guidelines are based on the assumption that a child is entitled to the benefit of income derived by both parents independent of the parent's divorce. There is a rebuttable presumption that the calculated amount of child support will be paid by the party not providing primary residential care. The party providing primary residential care is presumed to pay their proportionate share of the child support directly on the child or children. A parent obligated to pay child support may request a deviation from the presumptive child support obligation. The criteria that may justify deviation from the support guidelines includes: 1) the non-primary residential care provider is in fact providing primary residential care for more than 30% of the time on an annual basis; 2) the number of children for whom support is being determined is greater than six; 3) the interrelation of the total support obligation established under the support guidelines for child support, the division of property and any award of spousal support made in the same proceeding for which a parental support obligation is being determined; 4) the financial resources of the children; 5) the financial resources and needs of a party, including non-recurring income not included in the definition of gross income; 6) the standard of living the child or children would have enjoyed had the marital relationship continued; 7) the physical and emotional conditions of the child or children; 8) the educational needs of the child or children; 9) inflation with relation to the cost of living; l0) available income and financial contributions of the domestic associate or current spouse of each party; 11) the existence of other persons who are actually financially dependent on either party, including, but not limited to, elderly, disabled or infirm relatives, or adult children pursuing post-secondary education. If the primary care provider is legally responsible for other minor children who reside in the household and if the computation of a theoretical support obligation on behalf of the primary care provider would result in a significantly greater parental support obligation on the part of the non-primary care provider, that factor may be considered; 12) the tax consequences of a support award, including the substantial monetary benefit that a party may derive from any federal tax credit for child care expenses; 13) the fact that the incremental cost of health insurance premiums required to be paid by a party, notwithstanding the deduction of these premiums from gross income, exceeds 15% of that party's share of the total support obligation; 14) the fact that income at a reasonable rate of return may be imputed to non-income-producing assets with an aggregate fair market value of $10,000 or more, other than an ordinary residence or other asset from which the children derive a substantial benefit; l5) the existence of special circumstances regarding a child 12 years of age or over that, for the child's best interest, requires that the primary residential care provider continue to provide for employment-related day care; 16) an obligor party's substantial financial obligation regarding the costs of transportation of the child or children for purposes of parent and child contact (to be considered substantial, the transportation costs must exceed 15% of the yearly support obligation); and 17) a finding by the Court or hearing officer that the application of the support guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the child's best interest. In rare circumstances it is possible for the Court to deviate from the guidelines and order the primary caretaker to pay child support to the non-primary provider when a non-primary provider has the child for a significant portion of the available time. A Maine divorce Court does not have the authority to award child support for expenses which will be incurred after the child's attainment of majority. However, parents may enter into a binding contractual agreement regarding college expenses, so long as the agreement and obligation is defined and specific. As is true with custodial arrangements, the Court may modify a child support order if necessitated by a substantial change of circumstances.
Corning v. Corning, 563 A.2d 379 (Me. 1989)
When husband had resided in Maine for slightly more than six months, but both
parties had resided for most of their married lives in Massachusetts, the
Court dismissed the husband's action relying on the fact that since the wife
had not submitted herself to Maine jurisdiction it was unlikely that Maine
could acquire personal jurisdiction over her for the purpose of alimony and
property considerations. Even though Maine had jurisdiction over the divorce
action, Massachusetts could serve as an alternative forum on all issues.
Barclay v. Eckert, 2000 ME 10
Jurisdictional questions regarding determinations of child custody are controlled
both by the UCCJA (recently replaced by the UCCJEA) and by the Parental Kidnaping
Prevention Act (PKPA). In the event of a conflict, the PKPA preempts the UCCJA.
In the absence of a conflict, the statutes should be considered in conjunction
with one another. Once Maine properly assumes jurisdiction of the custody
determination, it retains jurisdiction as long as one parent continues to
reside here and the children's contact with Maine continues to be more than
slight. The home state determination is only necessary when determining which
state court should assume initial jurisdiction for the purpose of making child
custody determinations. A court may nevertheless decline jurisdiction pursuant
to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Eaton v. Eaton, 447 A.2d 829, 831 (Me. 1982), citing Boyd v. Boyd, 421 A.2d 1356, 1357-58 (1980) The Court is not allowed to consider fault in the distribution of property on divorce.
Grishman v. Grishman, 407 A.2d 9, 12 (Me. 1979), Cushman
v. Cushman, 495 A. 2d 330, 335(Me. 1985), Murray v. Murray, 529
A.2d 1366, 1368 (Me. 1987)
The Court is required to assign a specific value to all marital property for
clarity for the litigants and to facilitate appellate review.
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 532 A.2d 1046 (Me. 1987)
The value of the property is determined as of the time it is to be distributed.
Sweeney v. Sweeney, 534 A.2d 1290 (Me. 1987)
A professional license or degree earned during the marriage is not marital
property.
Cummings v. Cummings, 540 A.2d 778 (Me. 1988) Workers compensation benefits received or weekly benefits actually accrued but not yet paid are marital property. Workers compensation awards paid after the marriage has been dissolved is compensation for wages that otherwise would be earned by and paid to the injured worker after the termination of the marriage and is non-marital.
Bliss v. Bliss, 583 A.2d 208 (Me. 1990)
An unvested right to retirement benefits, including military retirement benefits,
is a contractual right, subject to equitable distribution in divorce proceedings.
Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055 (Me. 1992)
The Court may consider wife's anticipated social security benefits in computing
the deferred distribution of pension benefits of each party, despite fact
that social security benefits are not transferrable or assignable. A comparison
of deferred distribution values of pension is as valid a method as comparing
present value in dividing marital property.
Stevenson v. Stevenson, 612 A.2d 852 (Me. 1992)
The Court may determine that all of the proceeds from the sale of property
is marital even if that property has both marital and nonmarital components.
The Court is not compelled to accept husband's testimony that the portions
of the property that were marital were conveyed by husband to husband and
his wife for estate planning purposes. The Court may offset the husband's
larger infusion of capital by wife's entrepreneurial leadership and management
contribution.
Noyes v. Noyes, 617 A.2d 1036 (Me. 1992)
Although the increase in the value of real estate during the marriage not
attributable to marital effort remains non-marital property, the increase
in equity resulting from mortgage payments made during the marriage is marital
property absent a showing that the mortgage payments were made with non-marital
funds or that the parties agreed to exclude the increased equity from the
marital estate.
Williams v. Williams, 645 A.2d 1118 (Me. 1994)
The party claiming a nonmarital interest in a marital property has the burden
of proving what portion of the property is nonmarital and of showing how the
value of nonmarital contributions appreciated. The fact that the party's salary
paid for the mortgage does not make the property nonmarital.
Stotler v. Wood, 687 A.2d 1996 (Me. 1996)
Entitlement to net retirement annuity benefits accrued to the date of the
Divorce Judgment entitles the spouse to one half of the pension benefits existing
on the date of the divorce to the exclusion of any adjustments for cost of
living and without regard to the ultimate pension benefits received by Husband.
Marital property that is not set apart or divided in a final divorce decree
is omitted property which may be disposed of by the court as justice requires.
Smith v. Smith, 1997 ME 29, 690 A.2d 970
Failure to dissolve ownership in a closely held corporation was reversible
error, since divorced spouses could not be expected to continue a business
relationship that would optimize resources and profits.
Harriman v. Harriman, 710 A.2d 923 (Me. 1998)
The debts of either or both spouses defines a relationship with third parties.
It is not an asset to be divided. Although the court can and should allocate
responsibility for payment of debt between the spouses, it cannot affect the
relationship between the creditor and the spouse or spouses.
Harriman v. Harriman, 710 A.2d 923 (Me. 1998)
Income of a non-marital asset during a marriage is marital.
Clum v. Graves, 729 A.2d 900 (1999)
Income from nonmarital property, or any other source, constitutes marital
property because it is generally attributable to marital effort.
Transmutation of Nonmarital assets
Foundation cases
Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1977)
Determined that a property item can have both marital and premarital components
and that the nonmarital interest must be transferred to the party entitled
to it. Also described the "inception of title rule" as the basic principle
of law, but that the "source of funds" rule is an equitable exception to it.
Reversed in Long v. Long, 1997 ME 171.
Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980)
Held that a documented transfer during marriage of real estate owned prior
to marriage by one spouse into joint tenancy with the other spouse raises
a presumption that the donor spouse intended to transfer the property to the
marital estate in accordance with the "transmutation rule."
Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179 (Me. 1983)
Held that to the extent marital money was invested in the expansion and improvement
of a residency owned by the one party prior to marriage, the marital estate
was entitled to reimbursement in the amount by which the use of marital assets
or marital labor enhanced the value of the property.
Smith v. Smith, 472 A.2d 943 (Me. 1984)
Addressed an interspousal transfer of non-marital real estate from one spouse
to both as tenants in common. Held that Carter did not require that every
interspousal transfer to excluded from the gift exception of subsection 722-A(2)(A).
If clear and convincing evidence is presented that the transferor spouse did
not intend to transmute the property to the marital estate, the gift exception
subsection may apply in which case the state of title will control.
Moulton v. Moulton, 485 A.2d 976 (Me. 1984); Cushman
v. Cushman, 495 A.2d 330 (Me. 1985)
Established that the evidentiary burden imposed upon a party seeking to overcome
the marital property presumption militates in favor of the introduction of
corroborative evidence to support a party's direct testimony.
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 532 A.2d 1046 (Me. 1987)
Held that the Court must set aside as non-marital property the increase of
value of non-marital property acquired by gift after the marriage.
Dubord v. Dubord, 579 A.2d 257 (Me. 1990)
One party invested nonmarital funds into a jointly held and jointly titled
property. The Law Court held that this transfer fell within the 722-A(2)(B)
exception to the marital property rule that property in exchange for property
acquired prior to marriage is non-marital, so that once a party established
payments from a non-marital account, the statutory presumption was overcome
and the party is entitled to have set aside the non-marital portion of the
equity.
Long v. Long, 1997 ME 171 (Me. 1997)
Real estate held in joint ownership is marital property regardless of the
source of funds utilized in its acquisition.
Other cases of note
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 532 A.2d 1046 (Me. 1987)
A spouse who contends that a nonmarital asset has increased in value during
the marriage has the burden to prove that the asset increased in value because
of the inherent value of the property itself rather than because of marital
money or efforts invested in the asset.
Craigue v. Craique, 617 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1992)
The trial Court awarded possession of the marital home to the wife (as custodial
parent of the minor children) even though it was partially the non-marital
property of the husband. The Law Court affirmed stating that the non-marital
interest of the husband did not require the award of the property to him,
only the value of his non-marital interest.
McCracken v. McCracken, 617 A.2d 1034 (Me. 1992)
During the parties' marriage, Wife's grandmother conveyed $25,000.00 lot to
the parties as joint tenants in exchange for $5,500.00 of wife's non-marital
funds. The Law Court held that although the wife acquired the land in exchange
for non-marital property, taking title in joint tenancy was presumed to be
a gift to the marital estate and that the wife had failed to overcome that
presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
Noyes v. Noyes, 617 A.2d 1036 (Me. 1993)
The pay down of a mortgage on separate property during a marriage creates
a marital property interest in the asset.
Lalime v. Lalime, 629 A2d 59 (Me. 1993)
During the marriage husband transferred property he had acquired prior to
the marriage into joint ownership with his wife. Husband asserted that the
sole reason for the transfer was to secure a loan on the property, thus overcoming
the Carter presumption. The Law Court held that husband's explanation does
not rebut the presumption of gift, but only explains why the gift was made.
The presumption of a gift to the marriage may only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence that the transferor did not intend to transfer to joint
ownership, or was induced by fraud, coercion, duress, or deception.
Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d 1204 (Me. 1985) Fault is not a statutory consideration when determining the appropriateness of alimony.
Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1985) A spouse's action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity or res judicata as a result of the parties' divorce judgment.
Klopp v. Klopp, 598 A.2d 462 (Me. 1991) Payor spouse's unemployment does not require a modification of his alimony obligation because there was no reason to believe his current lack of income was permanent.
Hale v. Hale, 604 A.2d 38 (Me. 1992) The parties cannot by agreement divest the Court from its power to decrease the amount of alimony because the alimony only specifically prohibits an increase of alimony if so provided in the decree. An anti-modification provision as to a decrease in alimony imposes upon the payor spouse a greater evidentiary burden than if there was no such provision.
Gray v. Gray, 609 A.2d 694 (Me. 1992) The very high lifestyle of the parties during the marriage can justify an alimony award to a spouse with a significant income. Spouse can be awarded portion of marital closely held business despite spouse having made no contribution thereto on the basis of the parties' disparity of income and value of the property set apart to each spouse. Spouse's failure to cooperate in discovery requests may be a factor to consider when awarding attorney's fees.
Bonnevie v. Bonnevie, 611 A.2d 94 (Me. 1992)
It is inequitable to force a spouse to invade the spouse's marital assets
to reduce her entitlement to alimony.
Sherwood v. Sherwood, 622 A.2d 719 (Me. 1993)
Payor closed his place of business because of his long hours of work and inadequate
income derived therefrom. The Court reduced his alimony obligation, but refused
to reduce the obligation retroactive to the closing of the business. The Law
Court held that the lower court may consider whether the former spouse engaged
in self-help by ceasing to make payments.
Harding v. Murray, 623 A.2d 721 (Me. 1993)
The primary purpose of alimony is to provide for future needs of the divorcing
spouse and to act as a substitute for the loss of support enjoyed during the
marriage. Wife's right to payment did not arise until a judgment was entered
and, therefore, is not a dischargeable claim in bankruptcy.
Quinn v. Quinn, 641 A.2d 180 (Me. 1994)
Just prior to filing for divorce, husband had transferred property held by
a jointly owned corporation to the parties' adult children. Although the corporation
was ultimately set aside to husband, the Court found that he had committed
economic misconduct.
Hedrick v. Hedrick, 720 A.2d 1157 (Me. 1998)
A three year cut-off date for alimony is unreasonable where a child's uncertain
future health condition makes prediction of economic self-sufficiency impossible.
Spencer v. Spencer, 720 A.2d 1159 (Me. 1998)
A Motion to reestablish an award of spousal support cannot be entertained
by a court after the date of complete termination of an outstanding award.
Lyon v. Lyon, 728 A.2d 1273 (Me. 1999)
Cohabitation alone, without a substantial change in financial circumstances,
is not sufficient to justify modification. When an anti-modification agreement
has been incorporated into the divorce decree, however, the party seeking
modification must show more than a substantial economic change.
Bryant v. Bryant, 411 A.2d 391, 394 (Me. 1980)
The Court has the power to require a spouse to maintain a life insurance policy
or a health insurance policy on behalf of the other party.
Harding v. Murray, 623 A.2d 721 (Me. 1993)
The Law Court reversed trial Court's requirement that Husband maintain $250,000.00
of life insurance when the Judgment only required that one-half of that amount
be for the benefit of the Wife at the time of Husband's death.
Palleschi v. Palleschi, 712 A.2d 383 (Me. 1998)
The husband subjected his wife to threats, degradation, dominance, sexual
and emotional exploitation, force, and physical assaults. Evidence of abuse
that occurred prior to the statutory limitations was property admitted for
the limited purpose of establishing the wife's reasonable fear of continued
violence within the statutory limitations period -- fear which the court found
accounted for the wife's post-traumatic stress disorder.
McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 712 (Me. 1998)
One who knows or should know that he or she is infected with a sexually transmitted
disease is under a duty to protect sexual partners from infection.
Boutin v. Dionne, 458 A.2d 426 (Me. 1983); Philbrick
v. Cummings, 534 A. 2d 1307 (Me. 1987).
Only a substantial change of circumstances will warrant a modification of
a judgment or decree.
Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980)
The Court will balance an inquiry into the religious practices of one parent
with the need to determine what is in the best interests of the child.
Gerber v. Peters, 584 A.2d 605 (Me. 1990)
There is no attorney-client relationship between the parents and the Guardian
ad litem despite fact that parent is responsible for payment of the fee. The
Guardian's duty is to the Court and not to the parents.
Rowland v. Kingman, 629 A.2d 613 (Me. 1993)
The Law Court rejected wife's argument that as the primary parent, deference
should be afforded her decision that it was in the children's best interest
to move to Oregon. Intended relocation of a child to another state constitutes
a substantial change of circumstances and it is the court's role to determine
the best interests of the children in such circumstances.
Fraser v. Boyer, 722 A.2d 354 (Me. 1998)
Husband sought to introduce evidence regarding wife's pre-divorce conduct
to support his request to procure primary residency of his child. Wife's move
to another state triggers statutory establishment of a substantial change
of circumstances. Thus, the issue for the court was what modification of the
preexisting custody order was in the child's best interest. Where the court
was required, for the first time, to assign one parent a dominant relationship
with the child, evidence of relatively recent pre-divorce conduct was relevant,
along with all of the evidence of post-divorce conduct.
Kennedy v. State of Maine, 730 A.2d 1252 (Me. 1999) In Maine, the guardian ad litem in custody proceedings functions as the traditional adjunct of the court and, therefore, is an employee of the State within the meaning of the Maine Torts Claim Act.
Costigan v. Costigan, 418 A.2d 1144 (Me. 1980)
The Court may award reasonable rights of contact with a minor child to any
third persons.
In re Melanie S., 712 A.2d 1036 (Me. 1998)
An order terminating parental rights deprives the court of any authority to
impose a condition that preserves contact between the parent and the child.
Baril v. Baril, 354 A.2d 392 (Me. 1976) A Maine divorce Court does not have the authority to award child support for expenses which will be incurred after the child's attainment of majority.
Absher v. LaCombe, 432 A.2d 1241 (Me. 1981); Wood
v. Wood, 407 A.2d 282 (Me. 1979); Tapman v. Tapman, 544 A. 2d 1265
(Me. 1988)
Maine Courts require a petitioner to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that an increase or a decrease of a support obligation is necessitated by
a substantial change of circumstances.
Ault v. Pakulski, 520 A.2d 703 (Me. 1987)
Parents may enter into a binding contractual agreement regarding college expenses,
so long as the agreement and obligation is defined and specific.
LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 597 A.2d 62 (Me. 1991)
When a non-primary provider has the child for a significant portion of the
available time it is possible for the Court to deviate from the guidelines
and order the primary caretaker to pay child support to the non-primary provider.
Allen v. Allen, 603 A.2d 482 (Me. 1992)
Post-judgment interest which accrues on unpaid child support is simple interest
at the rate in effect when the payment became due.
Carter v. Carter, 611 A.2d 86 (Me. 1992)
The Court may assess arrearages of support in excess of six years. The six
year statute of limitations as to civil actions, which are not actions on
a judgment or decree, is not applicable. Since the Court cannot retroactively
modify child support, each payment becomes a judgment debt as of the date
due and Maine has no statute of limitations for actions on a judgment.
True v. True, 615 A.2d 252 (Me. 1992)
The Law Court held that money received by the wife through regular gifts from
an elderly grandmother was not income under the guidelines because there was
no legal obligation to continue making them in the future.
Tardif v. Cutchin, 617 A.2d 1032 (Me. 1992)
Post-divorce Court increased husband's child support obligation from $66.00
per week to $247.00 per week, applying the guidelines to assumed earnings
because the husband had transferred commercial real estate holdings to his
present wife and had otherwise acted to diminish or hide his real earnings.
The Law Court affirmed holding that a modification of child support will be
accorded "unusual deference" and affirmed absent a violation of some positive
rule of law when it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice so apparent
that it is instantly visible without argument.
Rich v. Narofsky, 624 A.2d 937 (Me. 1993)
The trial Court relieved the non-custodial mother of any child support obligation
because of her negligible income. The Law Court reversed holding that the
lower court was required to consider mother's part-time and summer earning
capacity.
Ouellette v. Ouellette, 687 A.2d 242 (Me. 1996)
A child's receipt of social security benefits should be considered by the
court when determining an appropriate level of child support. However, the
court may only deviate from the guidelines if it finds that their application
would be inequitable or unjust and it incorporates written findings in support
of the deviation.
Melanson v. Belyea, 698 A.2d 492 (Me. 1997)
The courts have the authority to modify divorce judgments entered prior to
January 1990 to provide support payments until a child's 19th birthday or
high school graduation, whichever occurs first.
Beck v. Beck, 733 A.2d 981 (Me. 1999)
A modification of a child support obligation can be retroactively applied
only from the date notice of the petition for modification was served on the
other party.
Peterson v. Leonard, 622 A.2d 87 (Me. 1993)
Parties' 1978 Divorce Judgment incorporated by reference the Settlement Agreement
between the parties which required Husband to contribute to the support of
the children while in college. After Husband fails to do so, the Wife brought
an action to enforce the Divorce Judgment and a plenary action seeking specific
performance of the Settlement Agreement as a contract. The Law Court held
that absent contract language to the contrary, incorporation of the Settlement
Agreement into a Divorce Judgment constitutes merger and the Agreement is
no longer separately enforceable as a contract. Once the Agreement was incorporated
into a Divorce Judgment, the Court has jurisdiction to enforce the obligation
even though the Court could not have created the obligation to support an
adult child absent the agreement of the parties.
Sargent v. Sargent, 622 A.2d 721 (Me. 1993)
Subsequent to parties divorce wife sues former husband alleging that he induced
her to execute the separation agreement by misrepresenting the extent of the
property accumulated during the marriage. The Law Court held that fraud is
an exception to the doctrine of res judicata and that the wife is not foreclosed
from asserting her action.